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A B S T R A C T
In early 2019 the United Kingdom is due to leave the European Union and with it the Common Agricultural
Policy. The UK Government has announced its intentions to formulate a novel agricultural policy following the
principle that public funding should be restricted to the provision of public goods. However, the acceptance,
interpretation and application of this principle is the subject of intense debate. We overview the background to
this debate, reveal the major flaws in present policy and identify and provide our answers to three key questions
which future policy must address: (1) What are the farm related public goods that public money should support?;
(2) How should that spending be allocated?; (3) How much should be spent? We believe that these questions and
their answers will be of general interest beyond the UK.
1. Introduction
Following the Brexit referendum the United Kingdom is due to leave
the European Union by March 2019. While this will affect all aspects of
the UK economy, probably no sector will be impacted more profoundly
than agriculture. For more than four decades the relationship between
the UK Government and the farming sector has been dominated by the
EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which has determined the
public subsidies paid to farmers. While a commitment has been given to
keeping these subsidies in place for the duration of this parliament
(Downing et al., 2018), expected to be until March 2022, the Govern-
ment has made it clear that major changes in policy are imminent. The
recent publication of a Command Paper (Defra, 2018a) consulting upon
a proposed Agricultural Bill expected within the current session of
Parliament (Downing and Coe, 2018) has signalled an intention to ra-
dically shift the emphasis away from general support for agricultural
activities and towards the longstanding objective of targeting public
money towards the provision of public goods (H.M Treasury, 2007,
2013), in particular those environmental improvements that are the
focus of the Government’s recent 25 Year Environment Plan (H.M.
Government, 2018). This radical shift in policy intentions is of sig-
nificant public interest, with more than 44,000 responses to the con-
sultation (Defra, 2018b), and we believe, is to be welcomed as a key
element in delivery of the Government’s overarching objective to en-
sure that the present generation is the first to leave the natural en-
vironment in a better state than it inherited (H.M. Government, 2011).
2. Why business as usual is not an option: the shortcomings of
CAP
Whether you are pro- or anti-Brexit, withdrawal from the EU’s CAP
should be welcomed. CAP succeeded at promoting food production in
post-war Europe, but inherent flaws in its design meant that this came
at massive cost. At its peak the CAP cost 73% of the EU’s budget and
still accounts for 38% of total spend (EU-ARD, 2017; IoG, 2018) and
provides nearly half of farm income (Lang et al., 2017). But the costs
are not purely financial; despite 25% of CAP support being paid
through its Pillar 2 Rural Development fund which supports a variety of
Agri-Environment Schemes (AES) (Science for Environment Policy,
2017), these have been criticised as poorly targeted, relatively in-
effective (Sutherland, 2002; Davey et al., 2010) and fundamentally
compromised and overwhelmed by the 75% of funding which goes
directly to farms under the more conventionally focused Pillar 1 of the
CAP (Pe’er et al., 2014). This has meant that, despite numerous and
ongoing reforms (Howarth, 2000; Hart et al., 2018), the period of the
CAP has been one of unprecedented levels of environmental damage.
Since the UK first joined the CAP in 1973 British farmland birds have
declined by 56% (Harris et al., 2018) with iconic species such as the
corn bunting suffering a 90% fall in numbers (ibid.); farming has con-
tributed three-quarters of sediment-load and around 60% of nitrate
pollution in UK water ways (Bewes et al., 2014; Holden et al., 2017);
and, as the Secretary of State has pointed out, over-use of agricultural
land means that we may have just 30–40 years before farm soil fertility
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.08.022
Received 6 June 2018; Received in revised form 30 July 2018; Accepted 15 August 2018
⁎ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: i.bateman@exeter.ac.uk (I.J. Bateman), b.balmford@exeter.ac.uk (B. Balmford).
Land Use Policy 79 (2018) 293–300
0264-8377/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).
T
is exhausted (Guardian, 2017). As Mitchell (2017) notes, “Overall,
agriculture is a major source of greenhouse gas emissions, the main
polluter and user of water, and the primary driver of habitat destruction
and species loss” (p.6).
CAP was designed as a public subsidy for the private production of a
private good: food. This results in the public paying twice; once as tax
payers and again as food purchasers. Despite suggestions to the con-
trary (e.g. NFU, 2018), joining the CAP entailed the acceptance of trade
tariffs which actually sent UK food prices soaring: during the first
decade of CAP subsidies in the UK, food prices rose at a rate of nearly
double that of comparable countries (OECD, 2018)1. While aiming to
maintain the capacity to produce higher levels of food is potentially
useful in a volatile world where demand and supply are imperfectly
known (e.g. Patel, 2009; Forbord and Vik, 2017), subsidising over-
production, particularly at times of ample supply, is poor policy.
It is also well recognised that the CAP has not even benefitted the
majority of farmers (Jambor and Harvey, 2010; Ciaian et al., 2015;
Dowler and Carter, 2016). The bulk of its funds are paid through the
Pillar 1 Basic Payment Scheme. However, because this is allocated on a
per hectare basis this means that three quarters of these funds go to just
one quarter of farms2. These are the largest and often richest farms in
the country and stand in sharp contrast to the 50% of farms who share
just 10% of these subsidies. Fig. 1 illustrates this inequity, comparing
how payments are currently allocated (the upper cumulative payments
curve shown in blue) with the situation if payments were evenly spread
across farms (the lower straight line shown in green). This inequality is
reflected in both the stark difference between these lines and the
standard measure of distribution; the Gini coefficient, a measure with a
value of 0 if everyone got an equal share of payments and 1 if a single
individual takes all funds. The calculated Gini value of 0.61 shows just
how unequal the present system of farm subsidies is (all calculations
described in the Appendix A). Wider comparisons further underline the
failure of the CAP to improve the situation of ordinary farmers who
only earn around two-thirds of the incomes of those in other sectors; a
situation which has not improved in more than two decades (ONS,
2017).
Quite clearly then the current system of public support for farming
is indefensible for the environment, for taxpayers, for food consumers
and even for most farmers. A radical revision is long overdue. What
then are the principles that should guide this revision?
3. A new deal for public spending on UK farming: the key
questions
A consideration of public spending on the UK farming sector re-
quires that we address three key questions:
(1) What are the farm related public goods that public money should
support?
(2) How should that spending be allocated?
(3) How much should be spent?
These questions, and their answers, are inter-related. Addressing
Question (1) requires a clear understanding of the benefits that farming
can provide, which of these are private goods best provided by markets,
and which are public goods requiring public support. Ultimately,
Questions (2) and (3) will determine the effectiveness of any subsidy
scheme. Question (2) addresses two issues. First, the way in which
funding is allocated determines both its uptake by farmers (e.g. heavy
bureaucracy, forbidding application processes or risky payments may
deter involvement in publically funded schemes3) and the value for
money which it delivers (e.g. introducing elements of competition for
funding and, where reasonably possible, payments for outcomes rather
than actions, can substantially increase the efficiency of funding).
Second, the degree to which farms can deliver some public goods
(particularly those related to the natural environment) varies markedly
between locations (Bateman, 2009). Targeting funds to those locations
which yield the highest net benefits can significantly improve value for
money to the taxpayer. The current Farming Consultation (Defra,
2018a) says little about Question (3), however the ability to efficiently
target spending on farm subsidies will be a major determinant of the
level of public goods provided by different levels of budget and should
in turn partly determine the size of that budget.
3.1. What are the farm related public goods that public spending should
support?
Agriculture is a private enterprise and food is sold in markets, di-
rectly to consumers, and is therefore by definition (and according to
official government guidance) a private, rather than a public, good
Fig. 1. Cumulative distribution of subsidies paid under the current CAP Basic
Payment Scheme (blue line) and how this curve would look with equal pay-
ments to all farmers (green line). (For interpretation of the references to colour
in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
Data from Defra, available at http://cap-payments.defra.gov.uk/Download.
aspx ; see Appendix A for calculation and data details.
1 CAP also caused farmland prices and rents to rise at an unprecedented rates
as they capitalised subsidy values (Hyder and Maunder, 1974; Traill, 1979,
1984), an effect that has not been dissipated by subsequent reforms and has
been seen across the EU (Guastella et al., 2017; Milczarek-Andrzejewska et al.,
2018; O’Neill and Hanrahan, 2013). It is important to note that this capitali-
sation benefits land owners and that over 30% of farmers are tenants and do not
own the land they farm (Eurostat, 2018).
2 Indeed half of Europe’s farms share just 5% of CAP direct payments
(Matthews, 2016). In contrast the 10% most supported farms (750,000 farms)
across Europe capture 55% of all direct payments which accounts for some 15%
of the entire EU budget (ibid.).
3 There are of course a diversity of factors which determine farmers’ provi-
sion of public goods (Zimmermann and Britz, 2016; Weltin et al., 2017; Inman
et al., 2018). Nevertheless, evidence shows that the main motivation for par-
ticipation in agri-environmental schemes is economic (Pavlis et al., 2016;
Howley, 2016).
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(H.M. Treasury, 2018)4. Public subsidy of private production is ex-
tremely unusual (especially at the rates indicated previously) and, as
noted above, runs the risk of consumers paying twice, once as purchasers
of food and again as taxpayers. Access to food is in the public interest and
preventing food poverty through social security payments or other actions
is an extremely worthy cause. However, food producers typically aim to
sell to the highest bidder, not the most socially deserving consumer.
Heated pleas for the public subsidy of food production will not alter this5.
Therefore, it is highly inefficient to attempt to deliver this food security
through the subsidy of food production itself, particularly because, as
noted earlier, the tariffs inherent in the CAP have actually caused food
prices to go up rather than down. Moreover, food prices are heavily in-
fluenced by trade, and as such the nature of trade deals post-Brexit will
likely have a far greater impact on the prices consumers face than will any
production subsidy scheme (Swinbank, 2017).
Indeed, as noted by the House of Commons (2007, p.3) the “only
long-term justification for future expenditure in the agricultural sector
is the provision of public benefits”, a position accepted by many land
owners and increasingly by farmers (CLA, 2018; Commercial Farmers
Group, 2018). The main public good highlighted in the Government’s
farming consultation document is environmental improvement (Defra,
2018a). Environmentally related public benefits which can be produced
by farming include, but are not limited to:
• Improved soil health
• Water quality improvement
• Water quantity regulation
• Flood risk reduction
• Climate change mitigation through the reduction and storage of
greenhouse gas emissions
• Other air quality improvements such as reducing ammonia emis-
sions
• Conservation and enhancement of biodiversity
• The provision of amenity views
• Recreational access
• Improvements to physical and mental health
• Supporting provision of the above environmental public goods
through diversification into other production with high public good
characteristics (e.g. woodland) and/or compensation for environ-
mental damage elsewhere in the economy (e.g. delivering net
environmental gains from housing developments).
The type and level of public good benefit will vary across location in
line with the underlying variation in the natural environment and
support levels should reflect that variation. Some areas (e.g. peatlands)
will be valuable for carbon storage while others will not. Similarly,
benefits will often vary according to the proximity of populations. So a
woodland planted near to a deprived urban area will yield far greater
recreation and mental health benefits than one established in some
remote location. Furthermore, many of the environmental benefits
listed above can be co-created, by which we mean that the use or
management of farmland can be arranged to generate several of these
benefits at the same time. For example, an area which is left un-
ploughed to reduce diffuse water pollution might also deliver flood risk
reductions, wildlife habitat, carbon storage and recreational benefits
(Bateman et al., 2013, 2016). It is the net public benefits to society
which farming can generate that should form the focus for, and de-
termine the level of, future public subsidies. As discussed in the fol-
lowing section, data availability and the development of decision sup-
port tools increasingly allows decision makers to eschew simplistic rules
for determining public benefits and hence target support payments to
those locations where they will be most cost-beneficial.
To reduce administration burdens on both farmers and public in-
stitutions, payments to farms should ideally be made through a single
channel, but with separate policies explicitly targeting each public good
(Alix-Garcia et al., 2015) and coordinating their co-delivery. General
and untargeted actions (such as those required under the Entry Level
Stewardship Scheme) should be avoided as they are likely to deliver
poor value for money (Hodge and Reader, 2010).
There are a number of nuances which any subsidy scheme would
have to address to be successful. For example, in some cases it may be
efficient to support the development and uptake of techniques which
increase productivity (output per unit input) at the same time as low-
ering environmental impacts (Ewers et al., 2009; Phalan et al., 2016;
Boyd, 2018). Indeed, linking such productivity gains to greater ‘land
sparing’ (taking land out of agricultural production; Green et al., 2005;
Phalan et al., 2011) may prove an important route for achieving the
objectives of the Government’s 25 Year Environment Plan (H.M.
Government, 2018), such as delivering on agricultural carbon emission
reduction targets (Lamb et al., 2016). Approaches which make en-
vironmental improvement commensurate with higher farm profitability
are also to be strongly encouraged. The large majority of farms will still
have the profitable production of food as their primary focus. However,
the level of any public subsidy has to be orientated towards the con-
sequent improvement in public goods (here environmental quality)
rather than increasing the private production of food. So, technology
which raises output while either directly or indirectly delivering a net
improvement in environmental public goods is a perfectly acceptable
target for public support. But conversely technology which fails to de-
liver such public goods or even worse degrades the environment should
not receive public subsidy. Throughout all of these changes the reg-
ulation of environmentally damaging activities will remain an im-
portant policy tool into the future.
While such productivity enhancements are important, the direct
delivery of environmental benefits is likely to be the major public good
provided by farms and therefore the main focus of public subsidy.
However, at least two other issues should be considered. First, farms
play an important part in rural communities, providing employment
and livelihoods as well as a less tangible social role. Second, there is
substantial evidence that, in the absence of any public funding, certain
sectors of the farming community would face substantial economic
hardship (Colston, 2018). The alleviation of such hardship is clearly of
social benefit in its own right. Moreover, even from a purely environ-
mental perspective, without a viable economic future for farming it is
feasible that some of the environmental benefits highlighted above
would not be delivered in some areas of the country.
4 A “Public good” is both non-excludable (i.e. non-paying consumers cannot
be prevented from accessing it) and non-rivalrous (i.e. use by one individual
does not reduce availability to others), an environmental example being the air
we breathe. At the other extreme food is a “Private good” as it is both ex-
cludable (i.e. consumers have to pay to access it) and rivalrous (i.e. use by one
individual precludes its use by another). It is notable that the Secretary of State
for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Michael Gove MP, de-
clined to classify food as a public good when overtly asked to do so during
House of Commons Committee evidence sessions (House of Commons, 2016;
Q280). Somewhat in between the public and private good extremes, “Common-
pool resources” are non-excludable but rivalrous and would traditionally have
included open-ocean fish stocks which anyone can fish but in doing so avail-
ability can be reduced if that stock is extracted too rapidly. Because both public
goods and common-pool resources are liable to be over-used a widely applied
approach to their conservation is to change their property rights to resemble
those of private goods, for example by imposing fishing quotas or imposing
costs upon those who emit pollutants. For completeness, “Club goods” are ex-
cludable but non-rival (e.g. satellite signals). For further reading see Varian
(1992).
5 A number of those appearing before the recent Environment, Food and
Rural Affairs Committee evidence sessions argue for public subsidy of private
food production on the grounds that this will improve the diet of the nation
(House of Commons, 2018). Given that such subsidies do not change the price
of food in the shops it is self-evident that changing the provenance of food
production will have little impact upon its consumption and be a massively
inefficient means of promoting access to food for the poor.
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Farm financial collapse is a very real threat for some farming
communities. While temporary abandonment of land is a possibility,
long term this is more likely to lead to the consolidation of small-
holdings into larger units. The environmental (and indeed social) con-
sequences of such change need to be considered if we are to deliver the
long term vision of the 25 Year Environment Plan. Given this, there is a
case for the provision of an income safety net6 linked to the production
of environmental public goods (Bateman, 2017). Furthermore, such an
innovation is readily affordable, does not undermine the targeted
funding of specific environmental benefits, and does not contravene
WTO rules7. As Fig. 1 shows, current subsidies are massively skewed
towards a small fraction of farmers. If we spread this out more evenly
the potential exists to both increase the typical farmer’s income, and set
aside a greater amount of public funding for the provision of public
goods. To illustrate this potential win-win, consider a case where we
pay all farmers an equal safety net income set at the current median
level of CAP subsidy received by farmers8. This means that the average
farmer has to be at least as well as off as they currently are, and
guarantees the half of farmers currently receiving the lowest levels of
support a relatively significant increase in income. Keeping overall
public spending levels the same, such a scheme would still leave more
than £1.5bn for the targeted support of public goods such as environ-
mental improvements: almost a tripling of the current levels of in-
vestment in the environment under CAP (details in Appendix A). Given
that this latter amount is also available to support farms, then once we
add in the safety net payment, it is clear that the large majority of farms
could substantially increase their support payment incomes under such
a scheme.
An income safety net would directly address pressures to avoid short
term socio-economic hardship for an industry where few farmers can
recall a time before public subsidies and where reliance upon such
subsidies is now extreme. Nevertheless, longer term the expectation
would be to see safety net payments taper down over time with funding
transferred into targeted public money for public goods payments. An
exception would be where certain environmental benefits are both
particularly difficult to quantify (e.g. landscape amenity values are
currently more contested than those associated with say recreation) and
where payments are easier to administer through straightforward in-
come based approaches.
While safety net measures would typically benefit economically
vulnerable farms, the move to a ‘public money for public goods’ ap-
proach does not penalise large farms. Indeed, given that the potential
for public good provision increases with area, such farms would have
the opportunity to earn substantial subsidy payments from environ-
mental improvement. The approach we propose would bring an end to
the current inequity of a system that provides large farms with higher
subsidies simply because they are large. Instead it offers all farms, large
and small, the opportunity to earn public subsidy income in return for
the provision of public goods. Indeed, even farms in regions with very
profitable agriculture could still benefit substantially from our proposed
subsidy model (Peh et al., 2014).
Some have argued that animal welfare is also a public good (Nurse,
2016; MRCVS, 2018). Whether or not this is the case, there is the clear
potential for moral hazard if public funds were used to prevent low
levels of animal welfare (in effect paying individuals to not treat ani-
mals badly). This then mitigates in favour of the use of regulations,
backed with trade restrictions against the import of food produced to
lower standards, as an efficient approach to delivering high standards of
animal welfare.
3.2. How should public spending on farm public goods be allocated?
As noted above, there are several considerations in the allocation of
public support for environmental public goods. While it might seem
more natural to address the amount of subsidy first and then consider
its allocation, this is not the best approach with regarding to environ-
mental improvement payments. The natural environment is highly di-
verse and the same level of spending allocated to different places can
yield widely differing levels of benefit. By first ensuring that we allocate
funds appropriately we can avoid highly wasteful misallocations and
thereby ensure that budgets go further and generate much greater value
for money.
Current approaches to agricultural subsidy have been heavily cri-
ticised as overly bureaucratic (Parker, 2017) and one of the advantages
of the per farm income safety net approach proposed above is its ease of
operation. As detailed earlier, future schemes have to avoid excessive
bureaucracy as the time taken and challenges involved in some schemes
are clearly a deterrent to participation (Engel, 2016). Linked to this, if
potential payments are seen to be at risk then this will also deter
farmers. So if there is a chance that minor errors in form filling will
result in payments being disbarred then this will reduce participation.
The issue of risk also affects the very worthy desire to try and move the
basis of payment away from funding actions and towards rewarding
outcomes. There is a clear inefficiency associated with paying for ac-
tions which may not deliver the desired benefits; obviously paying for
delivered benefits is far more efficient and mimics private markets in
which consumers pay for what is delivered. However, there is always a
risk that a given activity may not deliver a desired outcome. For ex-
ample, if a farmer provides high quality bird habitat in an appropriate
location, but no birds happen to roost in that habitat then, under a strict
payment for outcomes regime no subsidies would be provided. Clearly
it is reasonable for risk to be shared between the farmer and the tax-
payer in many situations, otherwise environmental schemes will not be
engaged with.
A key issue will be the targeting of subsidies to those locations
which support the best value for money in terms of the public benefits
delivered, ensuring that the efficiency can be delivered, in line with the
House of Commons (2007) statement. Here advances in monitoring,
data availability, modelling and decision support can provide very
considerable assistance to decision makers such as the UK’s Department
for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) who are ultimately
responsible for subsidy payments. As highlighted in the Government’s
25 Year Environment Plan, Defra have already invested in such decision
support tools (e.g. the ORVal model; see H.M. Government, 2018) and
more are in development (e.g. Rose et al., 2016; NEVO, 2018). The
natural environment is highly variable not only in its physical nature
but also in the benefits it can deliver. This information needs to be used
to target at least some public expenditure. The state of this information
6 Like all rules, some refinement is needed. For example, non-economic
‘hobby’ farms should be excluded and the division of existing farms to increase
subsidies should be de-incentivised by simply ensuring that such actions would
also divide subsidy payments.
7 A reallocation rather than overall increase in subsidies does not fall foul of
WTO rules provided it is not a hidden production subsidy. While there is a
common misconception that WTO rules prohibit environmental subsidies this is
not in fact the case. Annex 2 Section 12 of the 1994 WTO Agreement on
Agriculture notes that eligibility for agri-environmental payments “shall be
determined as part of a clearly defined government environmental or con-
servation programme and be dependent on the fulfilment of specific conditions
under the government programme, including conditions related to production
methods or inputs”, and that “the amount of payment shall be limited to the
extra costs or loss of income involved in complying with the government pro-
gramme” (GATT, 1994, p. 63). The clear eligibility of any “loss of income”
means that a reallocation of existing eligible subsidies (such as those under the
CAP) is permissible under WTO rules. For further discussion see Hasund and
Johansson (2016), and Bureau (2017).
8 In these calculations we set this as the median level payment (i.e. the
amount which at least 50% of farms received) under the Basic Payment Scheme
in 2016 which was £7734 per annum. This example is purely illustrative and
does not imply a prioritisation of safety-net over environmental improvement
payments. Ultimately public payments should reflect the level of public goods
they generate.
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is such that the piloting of targeted spending could commence in the
short term, before being rolled out nationally.
Linked to this, there is very considerable potential for Defra to both
reduce bureaucracy and improve efficiency through the use of compe-
titive tendering for public goods provision. There has been considerable
use of Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) mechanisms such as
procurement auctions where farmers are asked to submit bids to un-
dertake environmental improvement works (Latacz-Lohmann and
Schilizzi, 2005). Competitive bidding between providers typically re-
sults in greater value-for-money for the public. Moreover, in almost all
other areas of government it is highly unusual for public money to be
spent without engaging such a procurement process for contracts (H.M
Government, 2015). However, PES mechanisms can also be designed to
promote co-operation across farms (Elliott et al., 2015). Such ‘land-
scape’ scale collaborations are crucial to the provision of a number of
public goods, such as biodiversity and visual amenity, and are already
supported through the Countryside Stewardship Facilitation Fund
(EAFRD and Natural England, 2017) which the ‘Landscape Pioneer’
case study for the 25 Year Environment Plan seeks to build upon
(SWEEP, 2018).
It will also be necessary to use contracts which are sufficiently long
in duration to foster the provision of public goods, but not so long as to
discourage farmers from enrolling through fear of losing the ability to
vary their future activities (Broch and Vedel, 2012). Moreover, it is also
necessary to consider the effects of a subsidy scheme on farmers who
are not enrolled within it (Ferraro, 2011). Under a fixed budget, higher
individual payments mean more farmers are keen to join the scheme,
but fewer actually can. Those unable to join the scheme may still
maintain their environmental quality in the hope of winning contracts
in the future.
Contracting also enhances the considerable scope that exists for
involving the private sector and NGOs in the funding of environmental
public goods. Such approaches have already secured the involvement of
various water companies in funding farmers to improve local water
quality (Day et al., 2013; Smith et al., 2017; Bateman et al., 2018).
These private PES contracts deliver both private benefits, through re-
duced water treatment costs to companies and enhanced incomes to
farmers, and public benefits, in the form of cleaner rivers. Furthermore,
PES fall outside the jurisdiction of WTO rules (Franks, 2016).
Increased private sector funding of the public environmental bene-
fits supplied by farming could also be generated through the involve-
ment of the building sector. The November 2017 Budget committed the
Government to building 300,000 new homes each year in England
alone (H.M Treasury, 2017). However, The Government has also pro-
posed that the development of new buildings should foster net en-
vironmental gains (Ministry of Housing, Communities, and Local
Government, 2018). There is a clear potential for joined-up Govern-
ment action if these development policies are integrated with the pro-
posed new Agricultural Bill. Given the massive scale of housebuilding
envisaged by the Government, it seems inconceivable that any net en-
vironmental gain requirements could be delivered without recourse to
the more than 70% of UK land under agricultural production. If plan-
ning agencies are geared up to facilitate such a compensation scheme,
this could bring massive business sector funding into both agriculture
and environmental improvement. Such integration requires that we
tackle long standing research challenges regarding the nature and tar-
geting of such environmental offsetting schemes: should they benefit
nearby communities, society in general, a wide range of environmental
benefits (Badura et al., 2017) or just wild species (Lawton et al., 2010)?
Moreover, The Government must have a more nuanced approach than
“…targeting public funds at projects that provide purely public goods.”
(p. 144, H.M. Government, 2018). While the sentiment may be worthy
of praise, an overly simplistic demarcation will limit the extent to which
synergies between public spending, private incentive and offsetting can
be fostered.
3.3. How much should be spent? The appropriate level of public subsidy for
farming
Arguably the most major issue concerns the level of public subsidy
going into agriculture. As noted above, current public subsidies under
the CAP amount to about £3bn per annum, equivalent to about half of
UK farm incomes (Lang et al., 2017). There is a commitment to main-
tain this level of spending, at least under the current Parliament (Defra,
2018a). This is a substantial sum with a potentially high opportunity
cost and it is unusual for the public purse to provide such a high pro-
portion of income for a sector of the economy. Furthermore there is a
lack of systematic evidence regarding the cost-effectiveness (let alone
cost-benefit) of agri-environmental schemes (Ansell et al., 2016). Given
the major change in policy proposed by the Government, the need for
such evidence is now acute and is recognised in the 25 Year Environ-
ment Plan commitment to a second National Ecosystem Assessment
(H.M. Government, 2018) beginning in 2022.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of such systematic assessment,
there is ad-hoc evidence to suggest both that the costs of delivering
environmental policy objectives are significant (CCRI, 2010) and that
the benefits of public investments in environmental improvements can
be substantial (Defra, 2018a; UK-NEA, 2011; Natural Capital
Committee, 2017). These gains include both environmental enhance-
ments (RSPB, 2013; Batáry et al., 2015; Science for Environment Policy,
2017) and their consequent wider social and economic benefits (Mills,
2012; Courtney et al., 2013; Lastra-Bravo et al., 2015). In a recent as-
sessment Defra (2018a) estimated that every £1 invested through cur-
rent agri-environment schemes delivers roughly £4 worth of benefits;
while Natural Capital Committee (2015) suggest that much larger re-
turns on investments are achievable under a re-designed agricultural
policy which targeted spending to those areas which deliver the
greatest benefits. Future refinements such as competitive allocation
mechanisms and (where feasible) outcome-based payments could fur-
ther bolster the social benefit returns to public spending.
4. Concluding remarks
While UK interventions in agriculture under the CAP have re-
presented at best poor value for taxpayers and at worst the subsidy of
environmental degradation, we argue that a redesigned relationship
between the state and the farming community has the potential to de-
liver good value for money if orientated according to the principle of
public money for public goods. However, this requires that such sub-
sidies are redirected away from support for private production and
towards provision of the environmental and other public goods that
farming can supply. To deliver this we need to recognise what those
public goods are and how the allocation of public money can best be
organised to ensure their delivery. This will require the incorporation of
contemporary decision support approaches to the targeting of subsidies,
new thinking in the mechanisms used to allocate funds, and a will-
ingness to adopt a joined-up approach across Government departments.
The potential prize is considerable; a true win-win which benefits the
natural environment, tax payers and wider society, and the farming
community itself.
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Appendix A
Raw data for the Gini coefficient and safety-net income calculations
use Defra’s 2016 figures available at: http://cap-payments.defra.gov.
uk/Download.aspx
Gini coefficient
Referring back to Fig. 1, the Gini coefficient is calculated as the area
between the “Current Distribution” curve and the “Equal Distribution”
curve, divided by the area of the triangle under the “Equal Distribution”
curve. The “Current Distribution” curve cumulates the percentage
payments made under the CAP Basic Payment Scheme (BPS) ordered
from the farm that received the highest payment to that which received
the lowest. The area under this curve is calculated by multiplying this
list by the percentage that each farm represents of the 145,029 farms
which are subsidised under BPS (0.00689%), and sum all of the re-
sulting values. We then subtract the area of the triangle under the
“Equal Distribution” curve and then divide this number (the area be-
tween the two curves) by the area of the triangle under the “Equal
Distribution” curve to obtain the Gini coefficient.
Safety-net income
The median total annual amount of subsidy received by each farm
under the Common Agricultural Policy is calculated. We multiply this
payment (£7734) by the 154,744 farms currently listed as receiving
some form of subsidy from Defra (note that this includes 9715 farms
who do not receive BPS; data available at the above hyperlink), to get
the total expenditure necessary under an income safety net to ensure
that the median (i.e. 50th percentile) farm is at least as well off as at
present. We subtract this amount (£1197 million) from the total ex-
penditure under CAP in 2016 (£2862 million) and compare the amount
left (£1665 million) with the amount that is currently directed towards
environmental benefit under Pillar 2 (£600 million).
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